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I. INTRODUCTION
his Article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas and mineral law in Texas from October 1, 1996, through
September 30, 1997. The cases examined include decisions of
Texas state courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
II. CONVEYANCING ISSUES
Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. Henderson Family Partnership2
is a case involving the mineral/royalty distinction which found that the
deeds in question reserved a 1/16 fixed royalty interest rather than a 1/16
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney-at-Law,
Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
1. This Article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law, decided by courts sitting in Texas, but applying laws of other states,
are not included.
2. 958 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Tex. 1997).
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mineral interest stripped of appurtenant rights other than the right to re-
ceive royalties. The deeds first clearly conveyed an undivided 15/16 of
the minerals, and then recited:
In respect to the undivided one-sixteenth (1/16th) part of and inter-
est in the oil, gas and other minerals retained and reserved by the
Grantor in said land, it is understood and agreed that said one-six-
teenth (1/16th) interest is and shall always be a royalty interest. . . 3
The deeds went on to convey to the grantee as to the reserved interest:
(1) the right to develop, (2) the right to lease, (3) the right to bonus, and
(4) the right to delay rentals. Thus, of the five attributes of the mineral
estate, grantor retained only the right to receive royalty. The issue then
was whether this bare royalty right was an attribute of a reserved mineral
interest or a 1/16 fixed royalty. The word "royalty" was used six times in
each deed.
The Texas Supreme Court determined that Watkins v. Slaughter4 was
controlling. The deed in Watkins purported to convey 15/16 of the miner-
als, and it described the 1/16 retained as an "interest in and to all of the
oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from
said land." 5 However, the instrument also recited that the grantor "shall
receive the royalty retained herein only from actual production .... ,,6
The Court concluded in Watkins that a royalty had been reserved, and,
therefore, the same result must follow when interpreting the Temple-In-
land deed.7
As to the express recitals in the deeds that the "interest is and shall
always be a 'royalty interest,"' the court of appeals had held that such a
reference cannot serve to create a royalty interest without an express ref-
erence to royalties for actual production of minerals.8 The appellate court
assumed this to be the controlling factor in Watkins9 and French v. Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc.10 The Texas Supreme Court reviewed these decisions
and others and stated that it has never required that any particular word
or phrase be used."1 A mineral conveyance must be considered in its
entirety.12
This case indicates that the Texas Supreme Court has moved away from
"magic words" and from favoring one clause over another in favor of the
harmonizing canon of construction. This may not make the job of the
title examiner any easier because there are no "bright-line" rules of
3. Id.
4. 144 Tex. 179, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945).
5. Id. at 699.
6. Id.
7. See Temple-Inland Forest Prod., 958 S.W.2d at 185.
8. See Temple-Inland Forest Prod. Corp. v. Henderson Family Partnership, 911
S.W.2d 531, 534-35 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996), rev'd, 958 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1997).
9. Watkins, 189 S.W.2d at 699.
10. 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995).
11. See Temple-Inland Forest Prod. 958 S.W.2d at 186.
12. See id.
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construction. 13
III. OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A. HABENDUM CLAUSE
In Hitzelberger v. Samedan Oil Corp.,14 the Waco Court of Appeals
held that an oil and gas lease terminated for failure to timely pay royalty
under an habendum clause with unusual language. The habendum clause
provided:
Subject to the other provisions hereof, this lease shall be for a term
of Three years from this date (called "Primary Term") and as long
thereafter as oil and gas, or either of them, is produced in paying
quantities from said land or lands with which said land is pooled
hereunder and the royalties are paid as provided.15
The lease was a paid up lease, production was obtained within the pri-
mary term, and Samedan failed to timely pay two months of royalties
because of a clerical error.
It is the general rule in oil and gas law that failure to make proper and
timely royalty payments will not by itself allow the lessor to terminate the
lease. 16 This is based on the general concept that the royalty clause is a
covenant. In Hitzelberger, the obligation to timely pay royalty was in-
cluded as a part of the habendum clause.
Breach of a condition results in automatic termination of the lease-
hold estate upon the happening of the stipulated events. Breach of a
covenant does not automatically terminate the estate, but instead
subjects the breaching party to liability for monetary damages, or in
extraordinary circumstances, the remedy of a conditional decree of
cancellation.17
To save its lease, Samedan argued that the requirement to timely pay
royalty was a covenant. The court concluded that the lease was unambig-
uous and that the clear and precise language imposed a condition.' 8 Its
conclusion was not based on the alleged primacy of the habendum clause
as a canon of construction, but upon determining the intention of the
parties from the entire lease. 19 Although the court was reluctant to im-
pose a forfeiture, it applied the unambiguous language of the lease to
13. It was believed that "in and under" were magic words defining a mineral interest,
that "from actual production" were magic words defining a royalty interest, that the grant-
ing clause was more important than other clauses, and that deeds could be analyzed by
tracing the splintering of the mineral estate's bundle of sticks ((1) right to develop, (2) right
to lease, (3) right to bonus, (4) right to delay rentals, and (5) right to royalty) to define
whether the interests examined were minerals or royalties.
14. 948 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, writ denied).
15. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Morriss v. First National Bank of Mission, 249 S.W.2d 269, 279 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that "non-payment of royalty does not
terminate a lease, in the absence of a specific clause to that effect") (citation omitted).
17. Hitzelberger, 948 S.W.2d at 506.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 507.
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declare the lease terminated.20
B. ROYALTY CLAUSE
The two most important oil and gas cases reported in the 1997 Annual
Survey of Texas Law21 are perhaps the two most important oil and gas
cases in 1998, for a very unusual reason. Heritage Resources, Inc. v. Na-
tionsBank22 and Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co.23 were considered at the
same time, and the outcome in Judice was in part dependent on the more
extended reasoning found in Heritage Resources. On motion for rehear-
ing in Heritage Resources, the Court split four-to-four, and, therefore, the
motion was overruled by operation of law.24 On the original opinion, the
Court was split 5-2-2, but the majority evaporated on motion for rehear-
ing. Only Justice Baker stayed with the majority opinion. Justice Phillips
left the majority and joined the concurring opinion with Justices Owen
and Hecht. Justice Enoch left the majority by way of recusal, and Justices
Cornyn and Spector joined Justices Gonzalez and Abbot in the dissent on
Rehearing.25
The precedential value of Heritage Resources and Judice are thus se-
verely limited. The dissent on Rehearing wrote:
Because we are without majority agreement on the reasons support-
ing the judgment, however, the judgment itself has very limited prec-
edential value and controls only this case. Cases relying on the new
rule of law pronounced in the Court's April 25, 1996 opinion are
similarly restricted. See, e.g., Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co .... 26
Nevertheless, these issues will not go away, and if anything, litigation
will increase, so it is important to revisit Heritage Resources and Judice27
in the context of the opinion on motion for rehearing in Heritage Re-
sources. Obviously, there will be some new faces on the Court before the
next case on royalty calculation or post-production costs reaches the
Court, but many of the same judges will still be on the Court, and any
subsequent case involving these issues will have to consider Heritage Re-
sources and Judice.
Heritage Resources was intended to clarify the evolution of the law per-
taining to division orders and to make definitive some of the law pertain-
ing to the deductibility of post-production costs from royalty.28 The
leases involved differed in some respects, but each required that the roy-
20. See id. at 509.
21. See Richard F. Brown, Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, in Annual Survey of Texas Law,
50 SMU L. REV. 1371, 1375 (1997).
22. 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996), reh'g overruled, 960 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1997).
23. 939 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1996).
24. Heritage Resources, 960 S.W.2d at 619 (Tex. 1997) [hereinafter "Rehearing"].
25. See id. at 620.
26. Id. (citation omitted); see Judice, 939 S.W.2d at 135-36 (citing Heritage Resources
for the proposition that lessee [sic (lessor)] must share in post-production costs because
"[t]he royalty is to be determined based on 'market value at the well"').
27. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
28. See Heritage Resources, 939 S.W.2d at 120.
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alty for gas sold or used off the premises be based on "market value at the
well" and further provided that "there shall be no deductions from the
value of Lessor's royalty by reason of any required processing, cost of
dehydration, compression, transportation or other matter to market such
gas."'29 Heritage sold gas off the leased premises. Heritage deducted the
cost to transport the gas from the wellhead to the point of sale, as a post-
production cost, from the sales price before calculating royalties.
NationsBank sued Heritage contending that Heritage deducted transpor-
tation costs from the value of NationsBank's royalty in violation of the
leases, although NationsBank conceded that the transportation costs de-
ducted were "reasonable." The contested issue was whether Heritage
could deduct any transportation costs.
Royalty is generally thought to be subject to a proportionate part of
post-production costs, including taxes, treatment costs to render the pro-
duction marketable, and transportation costs. 30 Heritage contended that
the royalty clause defined the lessor's royalty as a fraction of the market
value at the well, and, therefore, reasonable transportation costs should
be deducted. NationsBank argued that the lease language specifically
prohibited this deduction. The El Paso Court of Appeals agreed with
NationsBank and reasoned that Heritage's interpretation would render
the post-production clause meaningless.31
The majority of the Texas Supreme Court (now reduced to only Justice
Baker) agreed that the post-production clause was meaningless, but the
Court reversed because the clause was surplusage as a matter of law.32
The majority held that "royalty" and "market value at the well" have
commonly accepted meanings in the industry, and by applying those
meanings, the post-production clause merely restated existing law.33 The
opinion is significant and is likely to be frequently cited for expressly de-
fining these common industry terms. The definitions are as follows:
Royalty is commonly defined as the landowner's share of produc-
tion, free of expenses of production. Although it is not subject to the
costs of production, royalty is usually subject to post-production
costs, including taxes, treatment costs to render it marketable, and
transportation costs. However, the parties may modify this general
rule by agreement.
Market value at the well has a commonly accepted meaning in the
oil and gas industry. Market value is the price a willing seller obtains
from a willing buyer. There are two methods to determine market
value at the well.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 122.
31. See Heritage Resources, 895 S.W.2d 833, 836-37 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995), rev'd,
939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996).
32. See Heritage Resources, 939 S.W.2d at 122.
33. See id. at 122-23.
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The most desirable method is to use comparable sales. A compa-
rable sale is one that is comparable in time, quality, quantity, and
availability of marketing outlets.
Courts use the second method when information about compara-
ble sales is not readily available. This method involves subtracting
reasonable post-production marketing costs from the market value
at the point of sale. Post-production marketing costs include trans-
porting the gas to the market and processing the gas to make it mar-
ketable. With either method, the plaintiff has the burden to prove
market value at the well.34
In the majority opinion, the commonly accepted meanings of these
terms in the industry operated to defeat NationsBank's claim.35 The
Court reasoned that because the royalty payable was based on "market
value at the well" (which necessarily included deductions for post-pro-
duction costs), a subsequent recital that the "value of the Lessor's roy-
alty" was not reduced by deductions for post-production costs merely
restated existing law. 36 Nevertheless, because the majority opinion ex-
pressly recognized that the meaning of "royalty" could be changed by
agreement, a more artfully worded royalty clause could have accom-
plished the result sought by NationsBank. For example, the result would
have likely favored NationsBank if the post-production clause had read:
In determining market value at the well there shall be no deductions
from the amount paid to Lessee by the first unrelated third-party
purchaser by reason of any required processing, cost of dehydration,
compression, transportation or other charge to market such gas, such
costs to be borne solely by Lessee.
The concurring opinion discussed at length the meaning of "market
value at the well" in the context of determining the amount of royalty
payable. 37 The two Justices (now four) seem to use "post-production
costs" and "marketing costs" interchangeably, and include within that
concept marketing costs that may be incurred after the gas leaves the
wellhead, such as processing, dehydration, compression, and transporta-
tion costs. 38 The concurring opinion noted that the issue of deductibility
of post-production costs from royalty under a market value royalty clause
is an unresolved issue in Texas39 and that other jurisdictions are split.40
The concurrence would have adopted what it perceived to be the majority
view in Texas and the better-reasoned approach of holding that post-pro-
duction costs are to be shared by the royalty owner under a "market
value at the well" royalty clause, absent language to the contrary. 41
34. Id. at 121-22 (citations omitted).
35. See id. at 123.
36. See id. at 122-23.
37. See id. at 124-31.
38. See id. at 124.
39. See id. at 125-27.
40. See id. at 127-29.
41. See id. at 126, 129-30.
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Contrast this view with the majority opinion's definition of industry
terms quoted above. The practical differences could be very significant.
Under the majority opinion, faced with a market value royalty clause, the
lessee must first determine whether there are comparable sales. This is
obviously impractical, uncertain, and an invitation to litigation. If there
are no comparable sales, then the lessee must calculate a "net back" price
from the actual point of sale by deducting reasonable post-production
costs. The concurring opinion described the difficulties in arriving at
"market value" as a threshold issue (before considering deductibility of
post-production costs), but offered no solution for simplifying that is-
sue. 42 For as long as Texas jurisprudence continues to support the notion
that "market value" is something different than the price that a reason-
ably prudent lessee is able to obtain while acting in good faith both for
himself and for his lessor, there will be no simple solution.43
However, as to post-production costs, the concurring opinion is simple
and straight forward. Lessor shares those costs, and they may be propor-
tionately deducted from royalty, unless there is language to the con-
trary.44 Left open is the question: deducted from what? If the lessee
must first go through the "comparable sales" analysis, there is not much
difference between the majority opinion and the concurring opinion. If
the concurring opinion is suggesting that market value, absent language
to the contrary, is a net back price, then there is a big difference between
the opinions and a rational basis for retreating from the morass of uncer-
tainty created by the market value cases. It would be interesting to see
the argument presented that market value at the well, for purposes of
calculating royalty, in the absence of language to the contrary, is the price
that a reasonably prudent lessee is able to obtain while acting in good
faith both for himself and for his lessor, less a proportionate part of post-
production costs.
The concurring opinion agreed with the majority in finding that the
prohibition against deductions from the value of lessor's royalty was sur-
plusage. 45 The dissent held that the language clearly stated that no post-
production costs are to be deducted from what would otherwise be paya-
ble as royalty based on market value at the well.46 The dissent offers little
guidance on the general issue of the deductibility of post-production costs
because these particular royalty clauses, in its opinion, make all such costs
non-deductible. 47
Heritage Resources is also an important division order case. In the El
Paso Court of Appeals, the division order issues were more important
42. See id. at 125-26.
43. See First Nat'l Bank v. Exxon Corp., 622 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1981); Exxon Corp. v.
Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866
(Tex. 1968).
44. See Heritage Resources, 939 S.W.2d at 130.
45. See id. at 131.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 130-31.
1998] 1225
SMU LAW REVIEW
because Heritage's first defense-that post-production costs are deducti-
ble under the royalty clauses-failed, and Heritage urged a second de-
fense based on division orders, which allowed the deduction of
transportation costs. Under the interpretation given to the royalty
clauses by Heritage and by the Texas Supreme Court, the provisions of
the division orders were no longer as important because those provisions
were essentially consistent with the royalty clauses in the leases. 48 Never-
theless, the Texas Supreme Court expressly disapproved of portions of
the appellate court's opinion that conflicted with Gavenda v. Strata En-
ergy, Inc.49
Heritage Resources clarifies the result when division orders prepared by
the operator incorrectly allocate payments among the interest owners in a
manner that differs from the lease provisions and the operator retains a
benefit. The division orders are not binding, and the operator is liable
for the benefit retained, but only the benefit retained, on the principle of
unjust enrichment. 50 In other words, the lessee who overpays himself at
the expense of the royalty owner signing the division order cannot hide
behind the division order. If the wrongful payment has gone to someone
else, the lessee can hide behind the division order. Any other result
would defeat the utility of the division order in expediting payments and
would further delay the orderly resolution of title issues. This part of the
decision should be very helpful in reducing the confusion about the effec-
tiveness of division orders, and neither the concurring opinion nor the
dissenting opinion in Heritage Resources addressed the issue of division
orders, presumably making the Court unanimous on this issue. To re-
cover any payments made under a division order prior to revocation, the
remedy must be pursued against the party that ended up with the money,
and a claim can be pursued against that party only to the extent of the
money that party received.51 It is a bright-line, a distinctive line, and it
fits within the well-established legal doctrine of unjust enrichment.
In clarifying the effect of division orders, the decision is a good one. It
is hard to see how any party could complain. Don't sign a division order
and accept benefits, unless you are sure of your own interest. Once pay-
48. See id. at 123.
49. See id. at 123 (citing Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986)).
50. See id. In Gavenda, the case was remanded for a determination of the amount of
royalty owed by Strata and the other working interest owner. Strata was only liable for
whatever position of the royalties it retained and was not liable for any royalties it paid out
to other owners. Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 692-93. Thus, Gavenda stands for the premise
that if the issuer of the division order makes a mistake in the issuer's favor (and does not
pay it over to another), then the issuer must give up its unjust enrichment to the rightful
owner. Presumably, the same recovery based on unjust enrichment would be available
against any overpaid party. The critical fact issue is to determine who received the over-
payment. This simple concept was unfortunately and unnecessarily confused by a poorly
reasoned opinion on remand in Strata Energy, Inc. v. Gavenda, 753 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ), which held that the operator was liable for
overpayment made to overriding royalty owners because it was a benefit "retained" by the
working interest owner, although the money was paid out to the overriding royalty owners.
Heritage Resources effectively disapproved the Gavenda opinion on remand on this issue.
51. See Heritage Resources, 939 S.W.2d at 123.
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ments are made, you cannot recover for an underpayment against anyone
except the party receiving the unjust enrichment. As to "market value"
and "post production costs," this case will be dissected by lawyers for
years. In an era of gathering system spinoffs and increasing gathering
costs, this will be an area of litigation for some time.
In Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co.,52 Mewbourne deducted a pro rata part
of post-production compression costs from lessor's royalty. The royalty
under the leases was to be a fractional part of the "market value at the
well" of the gas produced. Relying upon Heritage Resources,53 decided
the same day, the Texas Supreme Court held that under a market value
royalty clause, the royalty is payable net of any value added by com-
pressing the gas after it leaves the wellhead.54 Therefore, Mewbourne
was entitled under its leases to allocate to the royalty owners their pro-
portionate share of the reasonable costs of post-production
compression. 55
Having settled the meaning of the royalty clause with respect to post-
production compression costs, the Court turned to the effect to be given
to division orders executed by the lessors. One form of division order
provided that settlement was to be based on "net proceeds realized at the
well" and deleted all of the rest of the form, which expressly allowed
deductions for compression costs. 56 The Court held that "net proceeds"
expressly contemplates deductions and that its interpretation of "at the
well" means before value is added by preparing the gas for market.57 The
handwritten deletions did not change what was left in the division order,
so under this division order, compression costs were deductible. A sec-
ond form of division order provided that settlement was to be based on
"gross proceeds realized at the well." The Court concluded that this form
was ambiguous and did not upset a jury finding that the parties intended
that royalty was to be payable without deductions for compression.58
Amoco Production Co. v. Smith59 considered the statute of limitations
applicable to the recovery of royalty overpayments in an action brought
by a lessee and whether that lessee could recover attorney's fees. Amoco
listed both Herbert W. Smith and Huling W. Smith on its records as "H.
W. Smith," resulting in overpayment to Herbert and underpayment to
Huling for years. Amoco reimbursed Huling and sued Herbert for the
overpayment. The issue was whether the two-year or four-year statute of
limitations would be applicable. 60
52. 939 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1996).
53. See supra notes 26-51 and accompanying text.
54. See Judice, 939 S.W.2d at 134.
55. See id. at 135.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 137.
58. See id.
59. 946 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ).
60. See id. at 163.
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The claim was characterized as a cause of action for money had and
received, which conceptually falls within the doctrine of unjust enrich-
ment. "Unjust enrichment is not an independent cause of action but
rather characterizes the result of a failure to make restitution of benefits
under circumstances which give rise to an implied or quasi-contractual
obligation to return the benefits. '' 61 The law implies a contract, and it is,
therefore, a contract cause of action for debt not evidenced by a writing.62
At one time, Texas had a two-year statute of limitations applicable to
oral contracts and a four-year statute applicable to written contracts. 63 It
was, therefore, uniformly held that the two-year statute of limitations was
applicable to suits for unjust enrichment.64 However, the limitation stat-
ute was amended in 1979 and continues to provide that all actions for
debt will be under the four-year statute. 65 The statute of limitations ap-
plicable to this cause of action is now four years. 66
The trial court declined to award attorney's fees to Amoco, and on
appeal, the El Paso Court of Appeals refused to reverse the trial court's
decision, noting that the standard of review is abuse of discretion. The
appellate court was apparently persuaded that the refusal to award attor-
ney's fees was supportable because the overpayment was attributable to
Amoco's own mistake.67 Of more significance is the court's conclusion
that attorney's fees could be awarded in a proper case under section
38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code as a suit based on a
contract, even though the contract is neither written nor oral, but
implied.68
C. Top LEASES
Santa Fe Energy Operating Partners, L.P. v. Carrillo69 supports the ac-
tions of a lessee in taking protection leases from other parties while hold-
ing a lease from the adverse possessor. Carrillo's record title, for various
reasons, was only partially good. As to portions of his land, he was de-
pendent upon adverse possession to support his title. Carrillo leased to
Santa Fe. Santa Fe took protection leases from some of the other claim-
ants. The Carrillo/Santa Fe lease expired, and Carrillo refused to extend
the lease. Negotiations with another prospective lessee broke down be-
cause of the Santa Fe leases with the record title holders. Carrillo sued
Santa Fe and the record title holders for slander of title and tortious inter-
61. Id. at 164.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 164.
64. See id.
65. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ArN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
66. See Amoco Prod., 946 S.W.2d at 165.
67. See id. at 166.
68. See id. at 165-166. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1997)
provides in pertinent part: "A person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an
individual or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim
is for: ... (8) an oral or written contract."
69. 948 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
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ference with prospective business relations. The record title holders set-
tled by executing quit claim deeds to Carrillo.
One of the defenses to a tortious interference claim is that the party
interfering is justified.70 "Santa Fe's actions would be justified if it had a
right to interfere with the prospective contract as a matter of law or if it
had a colorable legal right it exercised in good faith."' 71 The appellate
court found the necessary legal justification in the Carrillo/Santa Fe lease,
which contained a proportionate reduction clause clearly contemplating
that Carrillo might own less than the entire undivided fee and providing
for the consequences. 72 The court held that Santa Fe had the right to
protect itself by taking leases from adverse claimants, "actual or poten-
tial,"' 73 relying on Shell Oil v. Howth.74 The opinion went further than
Shell Oil because Santa Fe had protected itself as to one small tract by
acquiring a quit claim deed, rather than a lease. The court reasoned that
under these circumstances, a protection lease may take the form of a quit
claim or an ordinary lease.75 As to tortious interference, the court re-
versed and rendered. 76
Carrillo's related claim of slander of title also failed. Slander of title
requires "malice," which is defined as making false statements regarding
title in the absence of color of title or a reasonable belief that the parties
have title.77 Given that Santa Fe was entitled to execute the protection
leases as a matter of law, then, also as a matter of law, Santa Fe reason-
ably believed the record owners held title.78 As to slander of title, the
court reversed and rendered. 79
Because the court affirmed limitations title in Carrillo, it also let stand
the award of $133,837 in attorney's fees against Santa Fe.80 Left un-
resolved was whether an adverse possessor could bring claims of tortious
interference and slander of title. Although Santa Fe urged this issue, the
court assumed without deciding that Carrillo could bring such claims be-
cause the court found that Santa Fe's actions were lawful. 81
70. See id. at 784.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 785.
73. Id.
74. 138 Tex. 357, 159 S.W.2d 483, 489 (1942).
75. See Santa Fe Energy, 948 S.W.2d at 785.
76. See id. at 782, 785.
77. See id. at 785.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 786-87.
81. See id. at 784. Santa Fe argued that, at the time of trial, Carrillo held an un-
perfected adverse possession claim and that such a claim could not be interfered with or
slandered as a matter of law. The court cited conflicting authority from other jurisdictions





Landreth v. Melendez82 held that the "accommodation doctrine," 83
which balances the rights of the mineral owner and the surface owner, is
not applicable when the rights of the mineral owner arise under a prior
express reservation of easement rights, rather than the implied rights aris-
ing under an oil and gas lease.84 At issue between the surface owner and
the mineral lessee was whether the lessee was required to accommodate
the surface owner's center pivot irrigation system by using low profile
pumping units rather than conventional pumping units.
The prior express reservation of easement rights reserved to the min-
eral owner the right:
• ..to take all usual, necessary and convenient means for working,
preparing, getting out and removing said oil, gas and other minerals
.... It is expressly understood that there shall be no liability on the
part of [mineral owner], their heirs and assigns to [surface owner],
their heirs and assigns, for damages to the surface estate in the here-
inbefore described land in connection with the testing, drilling, pro-
ducing and marketing of oil, gas and other minerals from the
hereinbefore described land as aforesaid.85
Thus, the surface owner was on notice that the mineral owner reserved
the right to use all "usual, necessary and convenient means" to develop
the minerals, and absent negligence, without liability to the surface
owner.
86
The case expressly distinguished its holding from Getty Oil87 by noting
that the rights of the mineral owner are to be determined by the interpre-
tation of the prior mineral reservation, rather than implied from an oil
and gas lease.88 This distinction is important because there are many re-
corded deeds reserving mineral rights in which the draftsmen have elabo-
rately described the easement rights. Many attorneys would have
considered this to be redundant and poor draftsmanship when the min-
eral estate is the unchallenged "dominant" estate. If the scope of the
easement rights now turns on express rather than implied easement
rights, then perhaps the poor draftsman was the careful (or perhaps pre-
scient) draftsman. Similarly, those lessees claiming under leases with
elaborately drafted granting clauses, including expansive easement rights,
82. 948 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ).
83. The "accommodation doctrine" is used to describe the relationship between the
mineral owner's dominant estate and the surface owner's servient estate. It generally
means that the dominant estate is not simply dominant, but the rights of the mineral estate
must be exercised so as to strike a balance between the interests of both the surface owner
and the mineral owner. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810-12 (Tex. 1972).
For a case with remarkably similar facts to Landreth in terms of surface usage and that
applies the accommodation doctrine, see Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.
1971).
84. See Landreth, 948 S.W.2d at 81.
85. Id. at 78-79 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 81.
87. 470 S.W.2d at 621-22; see supra note 83.
88. See Landreth, 948 S.W.2d at 81.
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may be in a superior (dominant?) position compared to lessees claiming
under simple grants to explore, develop and produce.
E. IMPLIED COVENANTS
In Neel v. HECI Exploration Co.,89 the court examined the duties owed
by a lessee to a lessor when the reservoir is damaged by a third party.
Neel leased to HECI, which drilled wells, produced oil, and paid royal-
ties. AOP Operating Corporation was producing excessively from the
same field by overproducing a well on adjacent acreage. HECI com-
plained to the Railroad Commission three times, but AOP continued to
produce. The overproduction resulted in damages to the reservoir and
lost reserves. HECI sued AOP and recovered $1,719,956 in actual dam-
ages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages, together with injunctive relief.
Neel, the owner of the surface and a royalty interest owner, did not have
actual knowledge of the suit until long after its conclusion. HECI refused
to share the judgment with Neel.
Neel sued HECI for breach of the contract to pay royalty, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant to protect the lease-
hold, an accounting, unjust enrichment, and punitive damages. The trial
court granted HECI a summary judgment. On appeal of the summary
judgment, analysis was complicated by the fact that the record on HECI's
judgment against AOP was unclear as to whether the judgment against
AOP was for 5/6 or 6/6 of the lost reserves and reservoir damage. 90
Although Neel's rights in the oil were transferred under the lease to
HECI,91 Neel still retained an interest in reserves sufficient to give him a
cause of action against AOP.92 The record was silent as to whether Neel
had done anything to proceed against AOP. At issue were the duties
owed by HECI to Neel for the damages caused by AOP, particularly
under the royalty clause and the implied covenant to protect the lease-
hold. Neel contended that HECI should have sued AOP on his behalf,
while HECI argued that it could not sue on Neel's behalf without an as-
signment of the cause of action.
The court concluded that if HECI recovered against AOP for the entire
6/6 without having to carve out a royalty share, then part of the recovery
would be at Neel's expense.93 If HECI failed to recover for Neel's share,
then, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Neel could be precluded
89. 942 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ granted).
90. See id. at 220.
91. The lost production was apparently oil, rather than gas, although the opinion does
not make this completely clear. Assuming that the production was oil, the court's assertion
that Neel's rights in the oil were conveyed to HECI under the lease would not ordinarily
be true. The typical lease form conveys the gas, reserving only a royalty, but reserves the
right to take the royalty share of the oil in kind. The court's analysis of the relationships of
the parties and the oil is sketchy, and it is entirely possible that different duties and liabili-
ties would arise under different royalty clauses as to gas, rather than oil.
92. See id. at 216.
93. See id. at 217.
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from an independent recovery.94 Although the court agreed that HECI
could not sue on behalf of Neel without Neel's consent, it concluded that
the lessee's duty at least required the lessee to give timely notice to
Neel.95 Neel could then sue, assign the right to sue, or waive his rights.96
The court stated:
We hold that a mineral lessee who determines that a suit for damages
is necessary to protect the leasehold, but lacks the power to sue for
all who have interests in the leasehold, must notify the unrepre-
sented interest-holders of the need for suit and the lessee's intent to
sue. This is not a new implied duty, but a specific means to fulfill the
existing implied covenant to protect the leasehold. Our holding rec-
ognizes the lessee's duty to protect the entire leasehold, not just its
own share of the theoretic production. 97
The court was careful to note that the duty to notify imposed on the
lessee would not create any liability as to the lessor who had independent
knowledge of the need for a suit.98
Liability for lost production does not conflict with cases holding that no
royalty was payable on take-or-pay agreements. Although those cases
hold that royalty is only payable by lessee on actual production, liability
in Neel is based on the value of reserves which will never be produced by
the lessee. Although recovery cannot be for royalty under the royalty
clause, the recovery may be measured by the lost royalty.99 Therefore,
the summary judgment denying recovery on the contractual claim for
royalty was affirmed, but the denial of the contractual claim for breach of
the implied covenant to protect the leasehold was reversed and
remanded.100
HECI's motion for summary judgment failed to address the allegation
of negligent misrepresentation based on HECI's failure to inform Neel
and its unilateral decision to sue, so that issue was also remanded. 01
Similarly, the summary judgment record was not complete on the unjust
enrichment claim.1 02
The Neel opinion is also important for its discussion of the relationship
between the causes of action asserted, the statutes of limitation, and the
discovery rule. The court relied on the recent case of S.V. v. R.V. 0 3 to
define the two critical elements involved in balancing the benefits of pre-
cluding stale claims versus the risks of precluding meritorious claims.
Those two elements are "inherent undiscoverability" and "objective
94. See id. at 217 n.l.
95. See id. at 217-18.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 218.
98. See id. at 219.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 223.
101. See id. at 219-20.
102. See id. at 220.
103. 933 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tex. 1996).
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verifiability. '104
The Neel court recognized that Neel's injury was objectively verifiable,
but the more difficult question was whether the injury was inherently un-
discoverable. 10 5 Notwithstanding the public nature of the Railroad Com-
mission, the state court proceedings and various public filings, Neel had
no reason to inquire or to be suspicious and had no actual knowledge of
the overproduction or the judgment. Therefore, the discovery rule was
applicable because the wrong and the injury were unknown to the plain-
tiff due to no fault of his own.10 6 The court was careful to distinguish
cases holding otherwise on a failure to-pay royalty claim under circum-
stances where the royalty owner had actual knowledge. 10 7
IV. DIVISION ORDERS
The two most important division order cases, Heritage Resources and
Judice, are discussed above in Section III.B.
V. EASEMENTS
Orange County, Inc. v. Citgo Pipeline Co.'0 8 considered the alienability
of a partial interest in a pipeline easement. In 1943, an easement was
granted to Citgo's predecessor for a twelve-inch pipeline which was con-
structed. In 1952, an easement was granted to Citgo for the construction,
maintenance, and operation of "pipelines," providing that additional
compensation would be paid for each additional pipeline. A twenty-inch
pipeline was constructed. In 1987, Citgo assigned the twelve-inch pipe-
line and an undivided one-half interest in the easement. Orange County
contended that the easement could not be partially assigned.
Although there may be a conflict in Texas law, the Beaumont Court of
Appeals adopted what it called the modern view: that commercial ease-
ments are partially alienable when the assignment does not burden the
underlying land beyond what was contemplated in the original easement
grant.' 0 9 The court cited but did not expressly adopt section 493 of the
Restatement of Property.1 0 The court held that the easement contem-
plated multiple pipelines, that each pipeline triggered additional compen-
sation to the servient estate, and that the owner of the servient estate had
presented no evidence of any additional burden.''
Orange County contended that the easement was not an exclusive
easement, and, therefore, apportionability of the easement should not be
assumed in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary. The court
104. Id.
105. See Neel, 942 S.W.2d at 221.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 222.
108. 934 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, writ denied).
109. See id. at 475.
110. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 493 (1944).
111. See Citgo Pipeline, 934 S.W.2d at 476-77.
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rejected this argument and held that the easement was an exclusive ease-
ment in gross as to pipelines.112 It quoted with approval the following
language from the Restatement:
Though apportionability may be to the disadvantage of the possessor
of the servient tenement, the fact that he is excluded from making
the use authorized by the easement, plus the fact that apportion-
ability increases the value of the easement to its owner, tends to the
inference in the usual case that the easement was intended in its cre-
ation to be apportionable. This inference is very strong in cases
where an increase in use is in fact advantageous to the possessor of
the servient tenement. 113
VI. LIENS
Abella v. Knight Oil Tools1 4 considered whether the holders of
mechanic's liens can divert the proceeds of current production into the
registry of the court prior to foreclosure of the liens. In this consolidated
case, multiple holders of statutory mechanic's and materialmen's (M&M)
liens"15 provided labor and materials to the operator for drilling, complet-
ing, maintaining, operating, and repairing three wells. The lien holders
were not paid in full for their services and timely perfected their M&M
liens against the operator. The operator assigned the leasehold to other
working interest owners. In the foreclosure action, the lien holders
sought the appointment of a receiver to collect and hold the proceeds of
production until the liens could be foreclosed. The assignee working in-
terest owners argued that they were entitled to the current production
proceeds until the liens were actually foreclosed, even if this meant the oil
and gas reserves became totally depleted. The trial court agreed with the
lien holders and appointed a receiver prior to the actual foreclosure to
collect the net proceeds of production from the wells and to deposit those
proceeds with the court.
The statute upon which the M&M liens are based clearly extends to the
equipment and material placed on the lease, and it also covers "the land,
leasehold, oil or gas well .... and lease for oil and gas purposes for which
the labor was performed . .. 116 The statute is silent as to whether the
lien extends to oil and gas produced prior to foreclosure or the proceeds
from its sale. The court held that the M&M liens attached not only to the
materials supplied, but also to the leaseholds, and that the "leases grant
the right to extract and produce the oil and gas from the land."' "17 The
majority of the court apparently concluded that this demonstrated a
probable right of recovery, and it declined to reverse the trial court's ap-
112. See id. at 476.
113. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 493.
114. 945 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
115. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 56.003 (Vernon 1995).
116. Abella, 945 S.W.2d at 850.
117. Id. at 851.
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pointment of a receiver.11 8
The dissent argued that lien statutes must be strictly construed, that
this statute does not expressly extend to proceeds, and that, at most, it
extends to the operator's right to extract production.'1 9 Because no in-
junction was sought, production should have continued, and the proceeds
of production should be free from liens.'
20
VII. GAS CONTRACTS
Condra v. Quinoco Petroleum, Inc.'21 is another en banc opinion out of
the San Antonio Court of Appeals considering rights to share in take-or-
pay settlements received by a lessee and the effect of division orders.'
22
The San Antonio Court of Appeals continues to closely follow the bright-
line rule that royalties are generally payable only on gas actually pro-
duced. 123 In Condra, lessee settled a take-or-pay claim for both a sub-
stantial recoupable payment and a substantial nonrecoupable payment.
The recoupable payment was essentially a prepayment for gas to be pro-
duced in the future. The nonrecoupable payment was attributable to the
settlement of certain other claims and the amendment of the gas purchase
contract to make the contract more favorable for the gas purchaser.
Lessee refused to share either payment with the overriding royalty
owners.
The overriding royalty owners claimed that they were entitled to share
in the settlement under the terms of the division orders. The claim was
denied by reference to the express language of the division orders, which
recited that payment was to be made on "all proceeds derived from the
sale of products produced from or attributable to said property .... 1124
The majority held that "attributable to" modified "products," and, there-
fore, the case was indistinguishable from its prior opinion in Hurd Enter-
prises, Ltd. v. Bruni,125 which held that royalty was payable only on gas
actually produced. Although the dissent argued that Condra was distin-
guishable from Hurd Enterprises, because in Condra there was a
nonrecoupable payment, 26 the majority found that a nonrecoupable pay-
118. See id.
119. See id. at 852.
120. See id.
121. 954 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
122. See TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. H.S. Finkelstein, 933 S.W.2d 591, 593
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (repudiation damages under take-or-pay con-
tract for gas not taken when there was subsequent production); Hurd Enters., Ltd. v.
Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (take-or-pay pay-
ments in lieu of takes).
123. See Condra, 954 S.W.2d at 71.
124. Id.
125. 828 S.W.2d at 106.
126. See Condra, 954 S.W.2d at 74-78. Part of the problem with following the reasoning
and opinions of the San Antonio Court of Appeals is that Finkelstein was first issued and
withdrawn as a panel opinion before finally being issued with the panel opinion relegated
to the dissent, and Condra was issued while writ was still pending in Finkelstein. In Con-
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ment was indistinguishable from repudiation damages. 127 The majority of
the court found its own opinion on repudiation damages in TransAmeri-
can Natural Gas Corp. v. Finkelstein128 to be controlling, and, therefore,
no overriding royalty was payable on the nonrecoupable payment. 129
The dissent argued that royalty should be payable on nonrecoupable
take-or-pay settlements. 130
The overriding royalty owners also sought to recover under the express
and implied covenants to market. As to overriding royalty owners, these
covenants do not arise under the lease, but under the assignment creating
the overriding royalty. The overriding royalty owner cannot enforce the
lessor's lease covenants. 131 Although there is an implied covenant to
market in the assignment creating an overriding royalty, the implied cov-
enant to market arising under the assignment is not triggered in the ab-
sence of actual production.1 32 The terms of the underlying oil and gas
lease with respect to the obligation to market do not negate or restrict the
breadth of the covenant implied in the assignment. 133
The dissent argued that the implied covenant to market arising under
the assignment is applicable to the negotiation of a gas contract and is
equally applicable to the renegotiation of that contract in the form of a
settlement agreement regarding a take-or-pay contract. 34
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc.135 construed a natural gas
transportation and processing agreement as to the intent of the dedica-
tion of reserves and whether the gas purchaser could unilaterally termi-
nate gas purchase contracts and escape the obligation to deliver gas.
Northern purchased gas from producers for delivery into Conoco's gas
processing and gathering facilities. The agreement was to continue "for
so long as the various Gas Purchase Contracts dedicated hereunder re-
main in effect, but not less than twenty (20) years, unless terminated pur-
suant to the terms herein."'1 36 Northern agreed to deliver, and Conoco
agreed to accept, "all gas for gathering, compressing and processing in
keeping with all the quantity and other provisions of [Northern's] various
gas purchase contracts in effect from time to time."'1 37
As the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proceeded with the de-
regulation of gas marketing, Northern began canceling and buying out its
contractual obligations to purchase gas from producers. By 1990, North-
dra, both sides of the nonrecoupable payment issue were again arguing their own Finkel-
stein position.
127. See id. at 71.
128. 933 S.W.2d at 596-97.
129. See Condra, 954 S.W.2d at 73.
130. See id. at 74-75.
131. See id. at 72.
132. See id. at 72-73. The court again relied upon its own opinion in Finkelstein, 935
S.W.2d at 598.
133. See Condra, 954 S.W.2d at 72.
134. See id. at 76.
135. 939 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, writ granted).
136. Id. at 678.
137. Id.
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ern was no longer purchasing gas from these producers and was acting
only as a gas transporter. Conoco contended that Northern was obligated
to continue purchasing all of the gas produced from the wells listed in the
agreement and to deliver that gas to Conoco for the productive life of the
wells. Conoco obtained a favorable jury instruction, a finding of breach
by the jury, and a judgment for over $20,000,000 in damages for lost gas
processing profits.
The court of appeals concluded that the agreement was unambiguous
and that it did not require Northern to deliver all natural gas reserves
from dedicated wells for the productive life of the wells. 138 Northern was
required to make deliveries only for so long as the gas purchase contracts
remained in effect. 139
The court reversed but did not render for Northern. Conoco con-
tended that Northern's contract cancellations were contrary to the good
faith standard of section 1.203 of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code 140 and Texas case law holding that every contract includes an ele-
ment of confidence and trust requiring each party to faithfully perform
his obligations under the contract.' 4' Concluding that nothing in the
agreement permitted Northern to cancel all of the contracts in bad faith,
the court remanded on the fact question of good faith. 42
VIII. LEGISLATION
The following is a brief summary of the new legislation adopted by the
75th session of the Texas Legislature. The new legislation covers areas of
exploration and production, environmental law, pipelines, taxes, and gen-
eral business issues.
A. EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
1. Acr: Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 299, 1997 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 1322 (Vernon).143
ISSUE: Definition of a marginal gas well.
SUMMARY: This Act gives the Railroad Commission the authority
to exempt certain individual marginal gas wells from
otherwise applicable production limitations. A
marginal well is incapable of producing, under normal
operating conditions, more than 250,000 cubic feet of
gas per day; however, no portion of this law shall
require production to be limited from a marginal gas
well if the well (1) has a daily deliverability of 100,000
138. See id. at 680.
139. See id.
140. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Vernon 1994).
141. See Northern, 939 S.W.2d at 680 (citing Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1992)).
142. See id. at 681 (citing Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 925
S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tex. 1996)).




cubic feet of gas or less or (2) is in a field for which
special field rules are not in effect.
May 26, 1997.
Ac: Act of May 21, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch.198, 1997 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 1065 (Vernon).1 44
ISSUE: Disposition by the Railroad Commission of well-site
equipment from a wellbore transferred to the Texas
Experimental Research and Recovery Activity
(TERRA).
SUMMARY: This Act provides that the Railroad Commission may
dispose of abandoned equipment from TERRA well-
sites for both human safety and pollution concerns.
The Act also provides that the property may be
removed in a commercially reasonable manner.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
Acr: Act of May 15, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 88, 1997 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 175 (Vernon). 145
ISSUE: The status of certain oil and gas workers or service
providers as independent contractors.
SUMMARY: This law resolves questions over the status of sole
proprietors, without employees, who are hired as
independent contractors to perform services on oil and
gas wells. Before this law, the oil and gas well operator
was required to provide workers' compensation
insurance for these persons. Under the new law, sole
proprietors are to be treated in the same manner as
independent contractors with employees and are not
entitled to coverage under the operator's workers'
compensation insurance policy unless agreed to by both
parties.
September 1, 1997.
Acr: Act of May 15, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 89, 1997 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 176 (Vernon). 146
ISSUE: Responsibility for the plugging of an oil or gas well.
SUMMARY: An operator, defined as a person who assumes
responsibility for the physical operation and control of
an oil well, must be designated and accepted by the
Railroad Commission. Also, the operator must have a
Railroad Commission-approved form of financial
security for the operation of the oil well. Section 2 of
the Act provides that the duty of a person to plug an
unplugged well that has ceased operation ends only
when the person's interest is sold while the well is in






144. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 93.013.
145. To be codified at TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 406.123(h).
146. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 89.002(2)(a),
89.011(b).
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EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
5.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL
1. ACT: Act of May 26, 1997, 75th, Leg., R.S., ch. 286, 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1301 (Vernon). 148
ISSUE: The disposal or temporary storage of litter or solid
waste.
SUMMARY: This provision amends the definition of "approved solid
waste site" to include a solid waste site registered with
the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission.
The Texas Natural Resources Conservation
EFFECTIVE:
Commission shall regulate temporary storage for future
disposal of solid waste as well.
May 26, 1997.
ACT: Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1373, 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5158 (Vernon). 149
ISSUE: Consolidated permit processing by the Texas Natural
Resources Conservation Commission.
SUMMARY: This statute explains the availability and requirements
of the consolidated permit process. This legislation was
necessary due to unintended changes when the Texas
Air Control Board and Texas Water Commission were
consolidated. The agency now in charge of this permit
process will be the Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Commission.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
ACT: Act of May 19, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 121, 1997 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 231 (Vernon).147
ISSUE: Acceptance, approval, or revocation by the Railroad
Commission of organizational reports, applications for
permits, or certificates of compliance.
SUMMARY: This Act provides that the Railroad Commission may
not approve an organizational report and may not issue
a certificate of compliance if the organization has an
outstanding violation or if a person holding a position
of ownership or control has within the past five years
held a position of ownership or control in another
organization which has an outstanding violation. The
Act also prohibits any entity from performing any
operation within the jurisdiction of the Railroad
Commission without maintaining a valid organizational
report and proof of financial security on file with the
Railroad Commission.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
2.
147. To be codified at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.142(e), (f) and as an
amendment to § 91.114.
148. To be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 365.012(k) and as an
amendment to §§ 365.011(1), 365.0120).
149. To be codified at TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5(J).
19981 1239
SMU LAW REVIEW
3. ACT: Act of May 21, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 206, 1997 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 1074 (Vernon).1 50
ISSUE: Environmental, health, and safety audits, providing a
penalty.
SUMMARY: This statute amends the Environmental, Health, and
Safety Audit Privilege Act, pursuant to an agreement
with the Environmental Protection Agency regarding
the Texas Environmental Audit program. Specifically,
the Act provides that:
1. the privilege against disclosure does not apply
to documents if a governmental official
charged with enforcement shows a compelling
need for the information to protect the health
and safety of individuals or the environment;
2. there will be no immunity for criminal
penalties;
3. if the court finds that a person intentionally or
knowingly claimed a privilege for unprotected
information, it may impose a maximum fine of
$10,000;
4. immunity for administrative or civil penalties
does not apply if the violation has resulted in a
substantial economic benefit for the individual.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
C. PIPELINES
ACT: Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1239, 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4713 (Vernon).15 1
ISSUE: Disclosure of the location of certain subsurface
conditions by a person who is selling unimproved real
property to be used for residential purposes.
SUMMARY: This law requires a seller of unimproved real property
that is to be used for residential purposes to disclose by
written notice the location of any subsurface
transportation pipeline, injection well, tank, or any
facility used or formerly used for the storage or
disposal of hazardous waste, natural gas, or petroleum
or any other petroleum product.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
ACT: Underground Facility Damage Prevention and Safety
Act, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1407, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 5266 (Vernon).' 52
ISSUE: Excavation operations that may damage underground
facilities.
SUMMARY: This so-called "dial before you dig" law requires an
excavator to make one telephone call to a statewide
1.
2.
150. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc.
151. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.010.
152. To be codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9033.
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EFFECrIVE:
toll-free number before beginning excavation. The call
will be routed to centers that will inform other
underground facility owners of the intentions of the
excavator. If one digs before calling, he will pay a fine.
If one breaks a pipe, even if he called first, and he
does not report having broken the pipe, he will have to
pay a fine as well.
September 1, 1997.
Acr: Act of June 16, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 675, 1997 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 2288 (Vernon). 153
ISSUE: The construction and operation of certain sour gas
pipeline facilities.
SUMMARY: This law provides that a person may not begin
construction of a sour gas pipeline facility before
obtaining a Railroad Commission construction permit.
A permit applicant must publish notice of the
application in a newspaper of general circulation in
each county that contains part of the proposed pipeline
route. The Commission may issue an order approving
the application if it finds that the materials and
methods to be used in the construction comply with its
rules of safety. Further, the statute defines "sour gas
pipeline facility" as a pipeline facility that contains a
concentration of 100 parts per million or more of
hydrogen sulfide.
EFFECrIVE: June 16, 1997.
D. TAXES
1. AcT: Act of May 23, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 208, 1997 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 1078 (Vernon). 154
ISSUE: Tax exemption for hydrocarbon production from
certain inactive oil and gas leases returned to
production.
SUMMARY: This Act provides a two-year Inactive Well Incentive by
issuing a ten-year severance tax exemption for
hydrocarbons produced from a well that has not
produced oil or gas for more than one month during
the two years preceding the date of application for the
exemption. However, previously designated three-year
inactive wells are not allowed eligibility as two-year
inactive wells. Applications for two-year inactive well
certifications are required to be made with the
Railroad Commission during the period from
September 1, 1997, through August 31, 1999. After
February 29, 2000, the Railroad Commission is
prevented from issuing such certification.
153. To be codified at TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6053-4.
154. To be codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 202.056(A)(4) and as amendments to




EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
2. ACT: Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1299, 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4939 (Vernon). 155
ISSUE: The joint listing on an ad valorem tax appraisal roll of
separate interests in minerals in place.
SUMMARY: This law resolves questions over the joint listing of
separate interests in minerals that are listed on ad
valorem tax appraisal roles. A $500 minimum value for
ad valorem taxation on income producing mineral
interests was required under prior law. A person with
a mineral interest valued at less than $500 was still
taxed if the aggregate value of all separate mineral
interests in common property exceeded the $500
threshold. Now, separate mineral interests which have
a taxable value of less than $500 are exempt from a
requirement that separate mineral interests be jointly
listed on the ad valorem tax appraisal roles.
EFFECTIVE: January 1, 1998.
3. ACT: Act of June 18, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 931, 1997 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 2927 (Vernon).156
ISSUE: The application of the oil production tax to new or
expanded enhanced recovery projects.
SUMMARY: For oil produced from an enhanced recovery project
other than a co-production project, this Act extends the
time for applying for the enhanced oil recovery
incentive from January 1, 1998, to January 1, 2008.
EFFECTIVE: May 29, 1997.
4. ACT: Act of June 19, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1040, 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3919, 3936 (Vernon). 157
ISSUE: The administration, collection, and enforcement by the
comptroller of various taxes and fees.
SUMMARY: This section of the Act requires that drilling and
completion costs include current and contemporaneous
costs associated with the re-completion of high-cost gas
wells. The person that is responsible must apply to the
Comptroller of Public Accounts for certification for an
exemption or reduction. The exemption must be filed
with the Comptroller by the later of the 180th day after
the first date of production or the 45th day after the
date of approval by the Railroad Commission.
If the application is not filed by the application
deadline, the tax exemption or deduction will be
reduced by ten percent for the period beginning on the
180th day after the first day of production and ending
155. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.12(b).
156. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 202.054(b).
157. To be codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 201.2037 and as an amendment to
§ 201.057(f).
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on the date on which the application is filed with the
comptroller.
Further, neither the Railroad Commission nor the
Comptroller may require the disclosure of information
relating to receipt reports, delivery points, volumes,
rates, or other gas transportation contractual
information, unless the disclosure is reasonably
necessary for the Comptroller or Railroad Commission
to implement or administer chapter 201 or 202 of the
Tax Code. This section expires on September 1, 1999.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
5. ACT: Act of June 19, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1060, 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4032 (Vernon). 158
ISSUE: Tax exemptions on oil and gas production.
SUMMARY: Operators will be entitled to an exemption from the tax
imposed by this chapter if they have increased
production by marketing gas from an oil well that has
been flared for at least twelve months. The Act also
provides for a fifty percent oil severance tax exemption
for five years for certain incremental production of oil
from a lease that averages no more than seven barrels
of oil per day. However, if the Comptroller's average
price of crude oil reaches $25 per barrel, in 1997
dollars for three consecutive months, the exemption
will be suspended.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
E. GENERAL BUSINESS
1. ACT: Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1432, 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5497 (Vernon). 159
ISSUE: Notice to a payee of a change in the payor of oil and
gas proceeds.
SUMMARY: This Act creates a mechanism to ensure that royalty
owners are aware of changes in the payors of their oil
and gas proceeds. A new payor must give written
notice to each payee for whom the new payor is
responsible for distributing the proceeds. The notice
must identify the lease or property and give the payor's
phone number as well as other items. If the payor fails
to notify the payee, the payor is liable for interest at
two percent above the amount otherwise prescribed.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
2. ACT: Act of June 20, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1324, 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5005 (Vernon). 160
158. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 201.058.
159. To be codified at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.407.
160. To be codified as an amendment to TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 66.
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ISSUE: The Board for Lease of University Lands and the
leasing, management, and administration of certain
public lands, and related fees and penalties.
SUMMARY: This law rewrites the statute governing oil and gas
leases for University Lands. Some of the topics that
are discussed are lease maintenance, royalty payments,
and audits. This law only applies to future leases.
EFFEcrIVE: January 1, 1998.
3. ACr: Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1315,
1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4984 (Vernon). 16 1
ISSUE: Negotiated rule-making by state agencies.
SUMMARY: This law creates an agency for voluntary negotiated
rulemaking of proposed agency rules. Meetings under
this Act will be conducted in a manner similar to
alternative dispute resolution through mediation
between the agency, the public, and the regulated
community.
EFFECTIVE: September 1, 1997.
161. To be codified at TEX. Loc. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 2008.
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